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CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND
POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Mark J. Freiman*

If it is correct to say that there is increasingly a convergence of law and policy in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, then I think the long-term
consequences will be especially challenging for the Attorney General in his or
her position as the Chief Law Officer of the Crown.
I say “if” that is correct because I do not want to make any special claim to
expertise in the analysis of current Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudential
tendencies. I am content to defer to the real experts for a reliable analysis in
that area, so my remarks are based on an amateur’s superficial overview that
may or may not be accurate. It goes without saying, as well, that the opinions
expressed in these remarks are those of that amateur in his personal capacity
and should not be imputed to the Ministry, the Attorney General or the government of Ontario.1

I. LAW AND POLICY
On one level, it is of course clear that law and policy cannot occupy watertight compartments in the context of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that
appears to require at least some consideration of policy issues in even the most
rigorous legal analysis. Section 1, as interpreted through the Oakes test,2 appears to require at a minimum a judicial assessment of what the policy goal of
any prima facie Charter violation is, the importance of this policy goal, and the
effectiveness of the means used to achieve that goal.
Moving beyond that, a number of tendencies in recent decisions may indicate further movement toward a convergence of law and policy. The recent
interest in the concept of “unwritten principles” in the Constitution, which
began with the Judges Remuneration Reference3 and continued through the

* Mark J. Freiman, B.A., Ph.D., LL.B., was appointed Deputy Attorney General on January
24, 2001 and Deputy Minister responsible for Native Affairs on March 5, 2001. He had been
Acting Deputy since July 2000.
1
While no responsibility for any errors should be attributed to them, I would like to note the
benefit I have derived in discussing some of these observations and ideas with the members of the
Constitutional Law Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney General, and in particular with Elizabeth
Goldberg, Chief Constitutional Counsel in that branch.
2
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103
3
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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Secession Reference4 (and is now trickling down to lower courts and provincial
appellate courts in cases like Montfort Hospital),5 is a move in that direction or
at least appears to support judicial interest in the policy consequences of legal
principles. Other possible indications of such a movement might be seen in
what seems to me to be an increasing number of multiple concurring decisions.
This development may indicate greater consensus as to the policy rationale for
a given decision than as to its legal foundation. Somewhat similarly — and I
am probably mostly simply demonstrating my own analytical deficits in saying
this — but a number of recent decisions seem to pose serious challenges to
those trying to abstract a consistent line of legal reasoning. Some of the discussions that I have heard recently may indicate that I am not the only person
having difficulty in that regard, and certainly the discussions of such cases as
Law v. Canada,6 that I have heard at conferences and seen in print from time to
time in the academic journals, also appear to confirm that at times the final
policy landing point is clearer than the legal road map used to get there.
The same trend may perhaps also be seen in the apparently
increasing willingness of the Court to depart from precedent in order to achieve
a
given
policy
result.
I
am
thinking
of,
for
instance,

M. v. H.7 in light of Egan,8 Mills9 in light of O’Connor,10 and most recently
Dunmore11 in light of the labour trilogy.12

II. ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Now I said earlier that if it is in fact the case that law and policy are indeed
converging in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, that poses
significant challenges for the role of the Attorney General. Some of the challenges are pretty straightforward; others are more subtle. The consequences for
the role of the Attorney General as Chief Law Officer of the Crown are at least

4

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (2001), 208
D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.).
6
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
7
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
8
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
9
R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
10
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
11
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.C. 94.
12
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313;
P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
5
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interesting, somewhat paradoxical, and, from some points of view, potentially
quite unsettling.
The immediate difficulty is pretty straightforward and is quite similar to the
difficulty that lawyers in general would have in the face of such a convergence.
Like any other lawyer, the Attorney General would have difficulty in giving
useful, practical legal advice to its clients in an environment that blurred the
distinctions between law and policy, and therefore minimized predictability in
terms of applicable legal principles.
I say “like any lawyer”, but the reality is that the Attorney General is not like
any other lawyer, and it is the uniqueness of the role of the Attorney General as
Chief Law Officer of the Crown that for me is the focus of the implications of
any convergence of law and policy.
Over a decade ago, Ian Scott gave a remarkable lecture on the role of the
Attorney General. 13 Before that, Roy McMurtry had similarly important
things to say in public about this role. 14 And of course, the late professor John
Edwards has written copiously and authoritatively about the uniqueness of
the role of Chief Law Officer of the Crown. 15 I commend these resources to
you and do not mean to repeat their analyses here. I do, however, think that it
is worth repeating a few observations that spotlight this uniqueness, because I
think there is significant confusion which I glean both at large — in the form
of the cocktail party conversation — and perhaps more surprisingly, in academic or quasi-academic writing and even, perhaps, in judicial decisions.
I think that I can safely say that there does appear to be in these various fora
some lack of appreciation of the role of the Attorney General, and specifically
of the difference between, on the one hand, the role of the political Attorney
General, who is an elected member of the legislature sitting in Cabinet as a
member of the Executive Council of the government of the day and, on the
other hand, the role of the Attorney General as Chief Law Officer of the
Crown.
I do not intend to talk at any length about the role of the political Attorney
General. He or she is the person who receives letters and personal deputations
with helpful suggestions as to how the law could or should be changed. He or
13

The Honourable Ian Scott, “The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights”,
(1986-87) 29 Crim. L.Q. 187-199; “Law, Policy and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy
and Change in the 1980s”, (1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 109-126.
14
The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, “The Office of the Attorney General”, in D. Mendes
da Costa, ed., The Cambridge Lectures (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 1-7.
15
J. Ll. J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1964);
The Attorney General, Politics and Public Interest (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984); “The
Attorney General and the Charter of Rights”, in R.J. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1987).
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she introduces legislation aimed at advancing the government’s political
agenda. He or she answers questions in Question Period from an appropriately
partisan political point of view.

III. CHIEF LAW OFFICER OF THE CROWN
I do want to speak at somewhat more length about the role of the Attorney
General as Chief Law Officer of the Crown. The responsibilities of the Attorney General as Chief Law Officer of the Crown are codified in section 5 in the
Ministry of the Attorney General Act.16 In general, they pertain both to the
provision of legal advice and to superintending litigation. Section 5 specifically
requires that the Attorney General “see that the administration of public affairs
is in accordance with law.” In order to ensure that this happens, all legal advice
to government comes from the Attorney General. The government is so organized that all lawyers have a direct relationship to the Attorney General, even
though many of them are seconded to ministries and provide legal advice exclusively to those ministries. Governmental lawyers are aware of their responsibility to the Attorney General to provide advice that is thorough, balanced and
independent of partisan political consideration. Even on the rare occasions
where legal advice comes from the private sector, it is always filtered through a
lawyer of the Attorney General. Constitutional advice is always provided internally.
The role of the Attorney General goes beyond simply providing legal advice.
Section 5 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act also requires that the
Attorney General “conduct and regulate” all litigation both for and against the
Crown. With a few exceptions, the Attorney General has a client (the Crown)
who, like clients in the private sector, gives instructions. However, the relationship between the Chief Law Officer of the Crown and this client is in many
ways quite unlike any in the private sector.
The Attorney General must be mindful of the client’s instructions and of the
interests upon which they are based. But the Attorney General, as Chief Law
Officer of the Crown, must also ensure that both the short-term interests of this
government and the long-term interest of Government with a capital “G” are
addressed. Without going into too much detail, challenging situations may arise
where governments change and find themselves in the middle of ongoing litigation publicly defending legislation and policies of which they are not the author
and which as a matter of policy they may not fully support. Similar difficulties
can arise where a given position on the law would produce a desired policy

16

R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17.
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result in one case, but that same legal position would produce a quite undesired
policy result in another.
It is widely understood that in the sphere of criminal prosecutions, the Attorney General as Chief Law Officer of the Crown must not take instruction.
Rather he or she — directly or through his or her agents — must exercise his or
her independent discretion free from any partisan political consideration. It is
also understood, although perhaps not quite as widely, that there are similar
constraints when the Attorney General seeks an injunction in the public interest. It is also true, however, and certainly worth emphasizing, that the Attorney
General as Chief Law Officer of the Crown must approach all litigation from
the principled perspective that the Crown’s legal position must be consistent
and uniform. The Chief Law Officer of the Crown must ensure that no position
is taken in court that is inconsistent with the law regardless of policy preferences.

IV. ATTORNEY GENERAL AS “TRANSLATOR”
Traditionally, though admittedly somewhat simplistically, the courts and the
government have been seen as operating in different spheres. One might say,
with apologies to Peter Hogg, that in the famous dialogue between government
and the courts, government is from Venus, and the court is from Mars, to mix
the metaphor, and the Attorney General as Chief Law Officer of the Crown is
the translator.
It is this role, the role of go-between and translator, that I believe is put into
question when law and policy converge. In my experience, government, including the political Attorney General, of whatever political affiliation, uniformly
respects in both theory and practice the role of the Chief Law Officer of the
Crown in its independence and in its dedication to the preservation of the rule
of law. The legal analysis of the Chief Law Officer of the Crown may not
necessarily always be welcomed by government, but it is uniformly accepted
notwithstanding its potentially limiting effect on policy choices. With the convergence of law and policy, the main challenge in this sphere is to continue to
provide reliable, accurate, impartial, balanced and non-partisan advice with
regard to the law in an environment that is not always marked by predictability,
consistency or coherence in the jurisprudence. It can also be a challenge to
explain to other government ministries the need for lawyers to oversee so much
policy development. At the same time, they find it hard to understand why we
cannot be more definitive in our opinions as to whether proposals will or will
not be found to be constitutional.
On the other side of the equation, I have heard suggestions emanating from
sources close enough to the Supreme Court of Canada to understand its work-

340

Supreme Court Law Review

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

ings and perspective, that when the Attorney General’s lawyers appear before
the Supreme Court of Canada they ought to consider the likely outcome of a
case from a policy perspective and then tailor their submissions so as to help
the court come to the right outcome — meaning “right” from the point of view
of policy rather than the point of view of law. It is suggested that the Attorney
General not come before the court with an extreme position no matter how well
situated such a position might be in law.
While such suggestions are no doubt well-motivated and may indeed be intended to reflect useful, practical advice in the context of a convergence of law
and policy, I wonder whether they properly take into account the role of the
Chief Law Officer of the Crown both constitutionally and from the point of
view of what the court should find useful. Just as government ought to expect
from the Chief Law Officer of the Crown a balanced, impartial and accurate
analysis of the law, it seems to me that the court should expect that government
counsel will provide it with a tough-minded legal analysis that does, no doubt,
reflect advocacy on behalf of the government client, but that is also firmly
rooted in the law rather than in politics or even policy.
It is becoming trite to say (especially in this 20th anniversary year) that the
Charter has had a profound effect on Canadian society. Its impact on the role of
the court is discussed constantly. One consequence of its impact that is barely
noticed is how the convergence of law and policy in Charter jurisprudence is
changing the role of the Attorney General in government and before the court.
While some convergence of law and policy is perhaps inevitable in the Charter
era, its pace and extent are not predetermined. Observers may see an irony if
the Attorney General were to be pushed along that path more forcefully by the
Court than by the government. Right now, though, I believe our heels are pretty
deeply dug in.
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